



Empire, Enlightenment and Regalism: New Directions in Eighteenth-century Spanish History

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Francisco Sánchez-Blanco, *El Absolutismo y Las Luces en El Reinado de Carlos III*, Marcial Pons, Ediciones de Historia, S.A.: Madrid, 2002; 454 pp.; 8495379414, €22.12 (pbk)

Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759–1789*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD and London, 2003; 456 pp.; 0801873398, US\$52 (hbk)

Antonio Mestre Sanchis, *Apología y Crítica de España en el Siglo XVIII*, Marcial Pons, Ediciones de Historia, S.A.: Madrid, 2003; 376 pp.; 8495379708, €23.08 (pbk)

'It is supposed', Julian Marias once observed, that eighteenth-century Spanish history 'is little more than a desert, where a few modest plants flower, all of little beauty and without scent'.¹ The publication of the books reviewed here indicates not merely a haphazard revival of interest, but draws attention to persistent, and still unresolved, scholarly debates concerning eighteenth-century Spanish intellectual and imperial history.

The Spanish Bourbons inaugurated reforms of their peninsular and overseas kingdoms and sought to replace the diffuse and unwieldy structures of governance inherited from their Habsburg predecessors. They strove to create a central bureaucracy, based on Madrid, and equipped with the revenue-generating devices necessary to restore the monarchy's prestige, to re-insert Spain as a military force in European politics, and to defend its sovereignty over a far-flung empire against the relentless encroachments of non-Spanish commercial agents

and interests. With *Apogee of Empire*, which concludes an interpretation of eighteenth-century Spanish history begun in their magisterial *Silver, Trade and War* (2000), Stanley and Barbara Stein, displaying characteristic erudition and eloquence, underpinned by exhaustive archival research, have endowed their subject with a classic monograph. While fully deserving of high praise, however, many of the assumptions upon which their narrative is predicated have been scrutinized, challenged and, in some cases, dismissed, by Spanish historians over the past three decades (including those whose new books are examined here). Indeed, the Steins' argument in *Apogee of Empire* may be considered to differ little from the thesis promulgated in their *Colonial History of Latin America* (1970).² Although most of this article will be devoted to an analysis of the Steins' new book, none of the works under consideration can be appreciated fully without reference to preceding scholarly disputes. Thus, it is useful to recapitulate the three main contentious topics in the historiography of eighteenth-century Spain: first, the disputed existence of Enlightened Absolutism, especially during the reign of Charles III (1759–88); second, the controversial quest to identify the ideological taproot of the Bourbon reform programme, a search usually revolving around the infiltration and relative influence of French and Neapolitan political and economic thought in Spain; third, the long-standing debate over the success of the reforms undertaken, especially regarding colonial commerce in Spanish America.

Long before the term 'Enlightened Despotism', first deployed by Raynal and Diderot in the 1770s, gained currency in Spain, its basic features were already the subject of lively debate. Nineteenth-century historians lauded the ambition and patriotism of the Caroline reformers, but repudiated as destructive their over-reliance on theoretical frameworks when it came to policy-making, as well as their infatuation with innovation. The tendency to view the Spanish eighteenth-century through the prism of 'Enlightened Despotism' was consolidated in the 1930s by Cayetano Alcazar Molina, who established a paradigm which survived intact, save for modifications to his chronological framework, for seventy years. Between 1700 and 1766, Alcázar Molina contended, there existed an uninterrupted succession of 'French and Italian ministers who operated with constancy and shared their influence with Spanish ministers and customs'. He also discerned continuities for the entire period 1700–1808, especially a form of 'protection, friendship and enthusiasm for [Spain's] recovery, [. . . and the] influences of the Court of Versailles in politics and administration, of the salons and Encyclopedists of Paris in literature and spirit, but, at the same time, a profound feeling of the Spanish tradition was maintained'.³ Twenty years later, Sánchez Agesta less sanguinely appraised the achievements of the reformers, claiming

that they had exploited new-fangled intellectual currents as a vehicle to enhance their own power, a 'design to augment royal power as the "principal nerve" of the reform programme [...] with an aim to achieve royal power which had no limits'.⁴ Antonio Elorza subsequently defined the 'ideology' of Enlightened Despotism as a quest for modernization, 'liberated from the obsolete institutions of the feudal past', with the capability of 'realizing the will of the sovereign, without perturbations, in those areas required to achieve social utilitarian ends'.⁵ José Antonio Maravall elaborated upon the 'political formula' of Enlightened Despotism, arguing that Spanish governmental reformers aimed to shepherd Spanish society simultaneously toward juridical, administrative, economic and fiscal homogeneity. In order to achieve this goal, the Crown employed an 'extensive intervention' to 'suppress' the power of the Church, 'eliminate the feudal remnants which weighed down agrarian society', and expand access to education, in order to advance social integration and destroy traditional barriers of resistance to the state's expansion.⁶ In spite of the existence of several shades of opinion, the role of the enlightened, dynamic and authoritarian State became a keystone and unassailable feature of Spanish historiography⁷ – until challenged by Francisco Sánchez-Blanco, whose new book is discussed below.

Although most historians recognize that Spanish eighteenth-century intellectual life relied on cultural importation, widespread disagreements persist concerning the extent, impact, and source of non-Spanish ideas. Too few scholars, I would argue, have examined the syncretism of the Spanish Enlightenment, the micro-dynamics of its assimilation and accommodation of foreign political and social thought, or the impact of Spanish ideas in other parts of Europe. Until the mid-twentieth century, the prevailing view drew inspiration from Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo's verdict on the disastrous effects – Napoleonic occupation of Spain and the dissolution of Spain's American empire – wrought by the incursion of nefarious and 'heterodox' French ideas among the governing elite.⁸ Gregorio Marañón's equally influential judgment discarded the 'reiterated stupidity' and 'contumacious error' of Charles III's ministers to 'de-Hispanicize progress', thus denigrating indigenous Spanish institutions.⁹ In the late 1950s, Jean Sarrailh and Richard Herr challenged this orthodoxy and argued for the progressive impact of French intellectual currents in Peninsular Spain which, in Sarrailh's view, brought "'useful" knowledge and modern doctrines and a freer spirit', a liberation from 'ancient traditions'.¹⁰ While some dissident voices asserted that 'English and Italian influences are just as clear' and that the 'Court of Charles III, like the intellectual life of his country, was not French but European: it took its politics from Italy and its economics from England', mainstream historians never fully distanced themselves from Menéndez Pelayo's stance.¹¹

A key exception is Sánchez-Blanco, whose *La Mentalidad Ilustrada* (1999) offers a 'third way' for this debate, with regard to the relative preponderance of French culture. Sánchez-Blanco focuses on the 'splendour of the first Enlightened thinkers' in Spain who emerged 'spontaneously from the cultural substratum' of Spain before the accession of the Bourbon dynasty. He refutes both the hypothesis that cultural revitalization emanated exclusively from the coterie of Royal ministers and the postulate that the Spanish Enlightenment was a 'mere process of imitation and the translation of foreign books and authors'. Instead, he suggests that the 'innovative thinkers articulated ideas open to Europe, and not unilaterally Francophile'.¹² The willingness of scholars to recognize non-French foreign influences has increased in recent years, with the wide diffusion in Spain of Neapolitan doctrines of political economy attracting the lion's share of scholarly attention. This valuable new work, by highlighting the intellectual interchange between Naples and Spain, demonstrates the necessity of examining the Spanish eighteenth-century within a pan-European context.¹³

In their previous books, the Steins convincingly depicted the Bourbon reforms as a 'defensive modernization', galvanized by the 'external stimulus' of threats to the Spanish American empire. Bourbon reformers 'responded only where and when circumstance made change unavoidable'. They asserted that the Iberian governments 'merely proliferated traditional structures' of economy and society, thus shoring up the 'gothic edifice' of the old system.¹⁴ Building on this claim, Jeremy Adelman traced Spain's reliance on 'rigid mercantilism' deeper into the century, asserting that Charles III's reforms did not address the core problems which had festered since the sixteenth century. Echoing García-Baquero Gonzalez's verdict on *comercio libre* as nothing more than an 'adaptation of traditional mercantilism to new exigencies',¹⁵ Adelman denied the Bourbon regime was animated by 'a vision of a new trading regime, composed of new markets or new products'. Commercial reform intended to 'reconstitute the relationship between mining, trade and specie flow to Spain – it opened new arteries, cleansed old ones and recognized *de jure* what was already happening *de facto*'. Charles III's reforms, then, were not a 'decisive rupture with past practices – hence the preference to describe this effort as a reconstitution of empire rather than a full-blooded revolution', a claim which the Steins corroborate in *Apogee of Empire*.¹⁶

Prior to assessing their argument in full, it is useful to recall that structural constraints frustrated the absolutist pretensions of Madrid's reforming oligarchy in Spanish America. In spite of their strenuous efforts to extend the sway of royal power, ministers in Madrid exercised limited control over the machinery of ultramarine governance. In my view, a comprehensive account of the ideas surrounding empire must therefore consider not only the aspirations and designs

of the metropolitan élite, but also the notions held by officials on the imperial periphery who exerted notable discretionary power. Late eighteenth-century colonial administration remained, to borrow Phelan's formulation, a 'dynamic balance between the principles of authority and flexibility', in which the highly centralized decision-making was 'counterbalanced' by the decentralized power of colonial administrators, who evaluated directives from Madrid and determined whether they were 'impracticable or even impossible to enforce'.¹⁷ The combined impact of these constraints, weakened further by the velocity of 'administrative revolution' undertaken after 1759 ensured that, as D.A. Brading has pointed out, the Caroline era was 'an Indian summer, a fragile equipoise, easily broken asunder by changes in the political balance of Europe'.¹⁸ The limitations on state-propelled strategies for change and the uneven penetration of the reforms in America presaged the failure to achieve any semblance of homogeneity in the Spanish Empire. Indeed, one of the most marked characteristics of late Bourbon Spain was the asymmetry of its reform success across policy areas: in Chile, for example, the fiscal reforms, which elsewhere stirred the economy, only produced modest changes, leaving local administrators exasperated and clamouring for the overhaul of the colonial system.¹⁹ In order to revivify the metropolitan-colonial relationship, people on the ground contended it would be 'necessary to overcome the regular laws of the [commercial] system and government of these dominions' because 'industry is entirely unknown'.²⁰ Even in the sphere of peninsular agriculture, moreover, the Crown was unable to implement the comprehensive reform it proposed at the municipal level, confirming Richard Herr's observation that 'for all the centuries of expanding royal authority, Spain remained in many ways a federation of self-governing municipalities'.²¹

In *Apogee of Empire*, the Steins begin their analysis with the assumption that late Bourbon reforms represented 'calibrated adjustment, methodical incrementalism, never radical change or restructuring' (27). They develop seven original and provocative themes related to Charles III's reign. First, they lay tremendous emphasis on the agency of transplanted Neapolitan ministers, especially the Sicilian-born Minister of the *Hacienda*, Esquilache, in guiding the inaugural reforms in Spain (1759–66). Second, they depict the *Motín de Esquilache* (1766), the famous uprising which began in Madrid, spread to the provinces and ended with the fall of that minister, whose interpretation remains an abiding quarrel in Spanish historiography, as a decisive rupture, reorienting reform from peninsular to ultramarine affairs. Third, the Steins examine the 'interface' of metropolitan and imperial policy (48), the growing consensus among ministers that the basis of Spanish recovery inevitably would lie in colonial development which, in turn, depended on the modification of transatlantic com-

mercial structures. Fourth, they contend that the *Motín*, by demonstrating the limits of monarchical authority, compelled the Crown's bureaucrats to become 'more pragmatic', and thereby 'less effective', and that reform after 1766 was pursued 'not by executive fiat imposing structural reform, but through exhortation, study and more study, *consulta* and *dictamen* and compromise' (115). Fifth, the Steins do not hail, as contemporary historians increasingly have, the *comercio libre*, or free trade, decrees as a 'panacea for the structural problems of delayed industrialization and colonial undersupply' (212). Sixth, they emphasize the international context of Spain's reforms, indicating that 'cosmetic change' proved inadequate when 'more radical change was made imperative' by international competition (351). Seventh, they offer a very novel argument on Spanish trade policy and its links to French debates, practices and proto-lobbying, which constitutes the most comprehensive treatment to date of this theme written in English. The Steins' book, therefore, contains new and important arguments with which future historians must grapple.

Several of the central claims of *Apogee of Empire*, however, are less persuasive and deserve closer examination. For example, the Steins justifiably emphasize the influence of Neapolitan currents in Caroline Spain, thus recognizing the continuities between Charles III's reigns in Naples (1734–59) and Spain, as well as buttressing their emphasis on political economy's galvanizing role in the Spanish reforms after 1759. Their analysis, unfortunately, ignores less favourable assessments of Charles's reign there, and tends to treat it as a kind of Rosetta Stone for deciphering the underlying intentions of the first series of reforms after his accession to the Spanish Crown. According to Patrick Chorley, for example, Enlightened ideas in Naples were 'intellectually fashionable', yet also 'superficial', because when reformers 'arrived at the difficult task of translating their ideas into practical administrative measures, its "Enlightenment" did not go as deep as its fear of trouble'.²² Closer attention to Charles III's Neapolitan period might then have led the Steins to reach very different conclusions than those to which their book comes.

Another less convincing feature of *Apogee of Empire* is the Steins' almost exclusive focus on New Spain (present-day Mexico). While indubitably Spain's most productive colony in 1788, the authors' emphasis on this area distorts the vital significance, at least in the minds of the Bourbon ministers, of the peripheral areas of the empire, especially the Río de la Plata, Chile and Cuba, all of which experienced formidable economic and demographic expansion during Charles III's reign. This book might have profited from wrestling with the divergent colonial development strategies devised for different regions of the empire. Moreover, precisely because *Apogee of Empire* sheds light on so many previously hidden

recesses of Spanish history, it is the more unfortunate that the Steins adopt an anachronistic conception of Spain as essentially part of the Atlantic World. This orientation leads them to construct a rigid dichotomy, separating those administrators and political writers concerned with overseas commerce from those preoccupied with peninsular interests. This framework derives from an understandable impulse, given that the Steins' primary interest is Latin America, not Spain, and their intention is to demonstrate the overall shift of attention from peninsular to colonial affairs. Nonetheless, their Atlanticist approach obscures the fact that, between 1762 and 1778, Spain – guided by European-leaning, regalism-inspired ministers – took at least as strong a stance in Continental and Mediterranean affairs, as its prominent involvement in clashes with the Papacy over Parma, and massive, yet failed, invasions of Portugal and Algiers indicate, as it did in American ones. On balance, the Steins have exaggerated the scope of imperial considerations in the mentality of peninsular Spain's governing élite, a defect deriving from their Atlantic perspective.

Consideration of this aspect of the Steins' laudable book makes clear the need to rethink the most appropriate approach to the history of Caroline Spain. Practitioners of Atlantic history, who have usefully remedied the previous scholarly neglect of the interstices of metropolis and periphery, have now begun to overemphasize these linkages, detecting imperial considerations lurking in every European event. Interpenetration irrefutably existed, but the moment has perhaps arrived for historians of Europe to grapple with the proper place of empire in their besieged discipline. Similarly, historians of the Atlantic World should heed Kenneth Maxwell's call to redress the 'almost total exclusion of detailed examinations of elites, institutions and, above all, intellectual life and politics and policy',²³ an endeavour which would permit a more precise analysis of the imperial anxieties that infuse the political languages of the late eighteenth century. With respect to Spain, I would not go so far as to argue, as did Vera Lee Brown, one of the few scholars in English before the Steins to address the place of America in the Madrid élite's worldview explicitly. Writing in the 1920s, Brown contended that America 'did not represent a goal of national ambitions' and played a 'very secondary role' in Spanish politics in the late eighteenth century.²⁴ Rather than remain awed by the fact that 45 per cent of Spanish national income was, directly or indirectly, linked to the colonies by the 1780s, it is instructive to appreciate, following David Ringrose, that the 'overall impact of American trade on the peninsular economy remained modest', considering that exports to the Indies equalled less than 2 per cent of national income in 1792.²⁵ By returning to the 'big picture' and reassessing the relative weight of empire in the late eighteenth century, the fields of European and Atlantic history stand to benefit.

More problematic still is the Steins' appraisal of Charles III's achievements, and their insistence that, in the contemporary scholarly climate, 'in an era of triumphant economic and political liberalism and critical postmodernism, there is a temptation to view Charles III as insufficiently "enlightened" and overly "absolutist"' (11). In this respect, *Apogee of Empire* would have been strengthened by a consideration of Sánchez-Blanco's *El Absolutismo y Las Luces*. In this work, Sánchez-Blanco disputes the standard interpretation of Spanish Enlightened Despotism, accepted by the Steins, which emphasizes the close collaboration between political writers and government ministers during Charles III's reign. Sánchez-Blanco contends that the widening gap separating the conservative ideas animating government policy from the progressive political thought articulated by Spanish intellectuals renders obsolete the notion of Enlightened Despotism.

The boldness of the book's argument cannot be overstated: no longer the benign overseer of a cultural renaissance and promoter of the public good, Sánchez-Blanco reduces Charles III to an ordinary despot, eschewing philosophers in favour of canon jurists who buttressed the monarchy's assertion of its authority against the Pope, the Inquisition, the Spanish bishops, the religious orders and the nobility. Underpinning Caroline Absolutism, according to Sánchez-Blanco, was a combination of 'conservatism and arbitrariness' (52), nourished by an 'anti-philosophy' which promulgated older theses concerning the divine basis of royal authority. This book is best understood in the context of Sánchez-Blanco's previous scholarship, especially his already mentioned *La Mentalidad Ilustrada*, in which he maintained that the re-awakening and subsequent efflorescence of Spanish intellectual life between 1700 and 1759 were unconnected to state initiatives and that the accession of Charles III heralded the Spanish Enlightenment's decline. The most recent comprehensive history of eighteenth-century Spain shares this judgment: Charles III's 'alleged Enlightened Absolutism', Roura I Aulinas argues, 'was reduced to its essence; that is, plain absolutism without need for the Enlightenment'.²⁶ This claim, however, should not obscure the efflorescence of certain sectors of Spanish culture, which Antonio Mestre Sanchis's *Apología y Crítica* chronicles. In this erudite, though otherwise lustreless, collection of essays, Mestre Sanchis indicates the conscious engagement of Spanish thinkers with their European counterparts. In particular, they confronted three areas which constituted the focus of foreigners' accusations about Spain: the cultural hegemony of the Church, the cruelty of the Spanish colonizers towards indigenous populations, and the paucity – if not, absence – of Spanish contributions to European culture (23). Nonetheless, Mestre Sanchis concurs with Sánchez-Blanco in his assessment that 'political power intended to

direct and orient the cultural life' of Spain (117). In concentrating on intellectual and cultural phenomena, however, both authors may overestimate the actual stretch of royal authority in Spain, whose severe limitations the Steins' *Apogee of Empire* describes in exquisite detail.

Sánchez-Blanco's book also deserves criticism for conflating the Enlightenment with political proto-liberalism, thus prompting him to devalue regalism's significance as a political ideology. Spanish regalism's core principle was the state's pre-eminence and supremacy in relation to the Church, albeit accompanied by the state's protection and support of the Church and its attendant institutions. Drawing on an array of European canon law writers, including Van Espen, Bossuet and Pereira, as well as bountiful indigenous tradition, Spanish regalist sought to revitalize royal power by attenuating clerical autonomy, circumscribing the Church's accumulation of wealth, and subordinating Rome's jurisdiction to the Crown's. Using legal and fiscal measures, they attacked the papal monarchy, defining its absolutist pretensions as a vestigial medieval abuse that had undermined the rightful authority of Church councils, a conviction which led them to stress those Tridentine decrees elevating and confirming the jurisdiction of the bishops.

Nevertheless, regalism was more than a thinly veiled and intellectually flaccid gambit to expand the size of the Treasury. Sánchez-Blanco may disagree, claiming that regalism's 'creative and innovative capacity' was very slight and that it guided Charles III's regime to a 'cul-de-sac'. He contends that regalism's 'innovative and creative capacity is much smaller than pure despotism', noting that 'the logic of regalism was conducive to the petrification of the Old Regime' (217, 255, 347). However, this judgement ignores the crucial, if often-neglected, role played by regalist ideas as catalysts in the crucial, inaugural stages of government reform in the 1750s and 1760s not only in Spain, but equally robustly in Pombal's Portugal, Tanucci's Naples, and Du Tillot's Parma.²⁷ Between 1750 and 1800, regalism evolved from a more narrow concern with perceived excesses of the Church's secular power into a multi-faceted ideology, which justified the extirpation of all obstacles blocking monarchical aggrandizement. This amplification of regalism coincided with, and was vitalized by, the infusion of European intellectual currents, particularly political economy. Late eighteenth-century Spanish regalism, therefore, should be understood as an emergent, dynamic notion about the state's function in society and the Spanish monarchy's place in the international order. Regalist theories of government permitted royal ministers to refashion the monarchy into an instrument of geopolitical authority and constituted the edifice upon which Caroline Enlightened Absolutism was erected.

It has become fashionable for historians of Spain to repudiate analyses which

attempt to judge Charles III's reign by the myriad *proyectos*, or policy proposals, which his ministers generated. They argue that such apologies 'end up sustaining a vision of the period as an epoch of reform', when what really 'proliferated were proposals, the majority of them left unrealised'.²⁸ The Steins' *Apogee of Empire*, by taking these projects seriously, furnishes the field of Iberian Atlantic history with a major monograph, opening up new avenues for research, but also leaving major questions unanswered. Sánchez-Blanco and Mestre Sanchis provide some, but certainly not all, of the responses to the unresolved aspects of *Apogee of Empire*. Consideration of these contentious and colourful works suggests, however, that José Ortega y Gasset was mistaken when he lamented, referring to the Enlightenment, that Spanish History lacked a *gran siglo educador*.

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Notes

1. Julian Marias, *La España Posible en Tiempo de Carlos III* (Madrid 1963), 19.
2. Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial History of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York 1970) and *Silver, Trade and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD and London 2000).
3. Cayetano Alcázar Molina, 'El Despotismo Ilustrado en España', *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, Vol. 5 (1933), 729, 750–1.
4. Luis Sánchez Agesta, *El Pensamiento Político de Despotismo Ilustrado* (Madrid 1953), 107, 174, 178.
5. Antonio Elorza, *La Ideología Liberal en la Ilustración Española* (Madrid 1970), 36.
6. José Antonio Maravall, 'La Formula Política del Despotismo Ilustrado', in Mario di Pinto, ed., *I Borbone di Napoli e i Borbone di Spagna* (Naples 1985), 27–8, 32–3, 21.
7. 'The Spanish Enlightenment', *Times Literary Supplement*, 15 March (1957), 154.
8. Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, *Historia de los Heterodoxos Españoles* (Madrid 1992), Vol. II, 573–674, *passim*.
9. Gregorio Marañón, *Vida e Historia* (Madrid 1962), 77.
10. Jean Sarrailh, *La España Ilustrada de la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII* (Mexico City 1957), 373; Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton, NJ 1958).
11. 'The Spanish Enlightenment', *Times Literary Supplement*, 15 March (1957), 154. On Spanish ideas in Britain, see Gabriel Paquette, 'The Image of Imperial Spain in British Political Thought, 1750–1800', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, Vol. 81 (2004): 187–214.
12. F. Sánchez-Blanco, *La Mentalidad Ilustrada* (Madrid 1999), 331.
13. On Neapolitan influences in Spain, A.J. Keuthe and L. Blaisdell, 'French Influence and the Origins of Bourbon Colonial Reorganization', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 71 (1991): 579–607; A.M. Rao, 'Carlos de Borbón en Nápoles', *Trienio*, Vol. 24 (1994), 5–41; and Vicent Llombart Rosa, 'El Pensamiento Económico de la Ilustración en España (1730–1812)', in E. Fuentes Quintana, ed., *Economía y Economistas Españoles* (Barcelona 2000), vol. III.

14. Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York 1970), 92–3, 103–4.
15. Antonio García-Baquero Gonzalez, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El Mundo Colonial Español Bajo el Monopolio Gaditano* (Cádiz 1988), Vol. I, 85.
16. Jeremy Adelman, *Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World* (Stanford, CA 1999), 29, 25.
17. J.L. Phelan, 'Authority and Flexibility in Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (1960), 55, 60.
18. D.A. Brading, 'Bourbon Spain and its American Empire', in Leslie Bethel, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America. Vol. 2 Colonial Latin America* (Cambridge 1984), 392, 439.
19. J.A. Barbier, *Reform and Politics in Bourbon Chile 1755–1796* (Ottawa 1980), 7, 190.
20. Archivo General de Indias (Seville), Indiferente 2436, Ambrosio O'Higgins to Antonio Valdes, 21 September 1789.
21. R. Herr, *Rural Change and Royal Finances at the End of the Old Regime* (London and Berkeley, CA 1989), 44.
22. Patrick Chorley, *Oil Silk and Enlightenment: Economic Problems in XVIII Century Naples* (Naples 1965), 149–50, 173.
23. Kenneth Maxwell, 'The Atlantic in the Eighteenth Century: A Southern Perspective on the Need to Return to the "Big Picture"', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6th series*, Vol. 3 (1993), 209–36, here 210.
24. Vera Lee Brown, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations in America in the Closing Years of the Colonial Era', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 5 (1922), 329–482.
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26. Lluís Roura I Aulinas, 'Expectativas y Frustración Bajo el Reformismo Borbónico', in R. García Cárcel, ed., *Historia de España Siglo XVIII: La España de los Borbones* (Madrid 2002), 217.
27. Antonio Álvarez de Morales, *El Pensamiento Político y Jurídico de Campomanes* (Madrid 1989), 29; Charles C. Noel, 'Clerics and Crown in Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808: Jesuits, Jansenists and Enlightened Reformers', in J.E. Bradley and D.K. Kley, eds, *Religion and Politics in Enlightened Europe* (Notre Dame, IN 2001), 131–3; William J. Callahan, *Church, Politics and Society in Spain 1750–1874* (London and Cambridge, MA 1984); D.A. Brading, *Church and State in Bourbon Mexico: The Diocese of Michacán 1749–1810* (Cambridge 1994), 11; Samuel J. Miller, *Portugal and Rome c. 1748–1830: An Aspect of the Catholic Enlightenment* (Rome 1978), 5–6; E.E. Hales, *The Revolution and the Papacy 1769–1846* (London 1960), 20–1.
28. Mauro Hernández Benítez, 'Carlos III: Un Mito Progresista', in Equipo Madrid, *Carlos III, Madrid y la Ilustración* (Madrid 1989), 8, 22.

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