

European History Quarterly

<http://ehq.sagepub.com/>

The Persistence of Mutual Influence: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s

Matthew Brown and Gabriel Paquette
European History Quarterly 2011 41: 387
DOI: 10.1177/0265691411405297

The online version of this article can be found at:
<http://ehq.sagepub.com/content/41/3/387>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

Additional services and information for *European History Quarterly* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://ehq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://ehq.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>



The Persistence of Mutual Influence: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s

European History Quarterly

41(3) 387–396

© The Author(s) 2011

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0265691411405297

ehq.sagepub.com



Matthew Brown *University of Bristol, UK*

Gabriel Paquette *The Johns Hopkins University, USA*

Abstract

The independence of Latin America from colonial rule in the first decades of the nineteenth century is generally held to have broken the bonds which had linked Europe to the Americas for three centuries. This article contends that a re-examination of the decade of the 1820s reveals the persistence, as well as the reconfiguration, of connections between the Old World and the New after the dissolution of the Iberian Atlantic monarchies. Some of these multi-faceted connections are introduced and explored, most notably commercial ties, intellectual and cultural influences, immigration, financial obligations, the slave trade and its suppression, and diplomatic negotiations. Recognition and appreciation of these connections has important consequences for our understandings of the history of the Atlantic World, the 'Age of Revolutions', and Latin American Independence itself.

Keywords

1820s, Atlantic History, European–Latin American relations, Iberian History

In the early modern period, the histories of Europe and Latin America were intimately interconnected, or 'entangled', as an increasingly influential school of historians have come to argue.¹ Colonialism, global trade, and transoceanic migration, both coerced and free, ensured that the continents' trajectories were entwined, their development mutually constitutive, and their interaction unceasing. Figures as different as Edmund Burke and the Abbé Raynal, Adam Smith and Karl Marx, all shared this conviction. Contemporary practitioners of Atlantic History have confirmed these insights, made them more nuanced, and added texture.²

Corresponding author:

Matthew Brown, University of Bristol, 15 Woodland Road, BS8 1TE, UK

Email: matthew.brown@bris.ac.uk

The dissolution of the Atlantic empires c.1770–1825 is generally held to have attenuated the linkages which had multiplied and thickened over the previous three centuries. If Atlantic History's central emphasis is on connections across oceans and imperial boundaries, then that of the 'Age of Revolutions' is rupture and radical discontinuity, in spite of mutual revolutionary influences, as new states stumbled out of the wreckage of empire.³

In many respects, however, scholars are beginning to perceive that imperial disaggregation in some cases deepened the connections rather than sundered them.⁴ Besides outlays of blood and treasure, independence struggles activated ever-simmering geopolitical rivalries in the Old World. Franco-Spanish intervention in the American Revolution after 1778 and Britain's profligate and unsuccessful invasion of Revolutionary Saint-Domingue in 1793–98, in which it lost 15,000 troops,⁵ are two key examples. European conflicts, too, reverberated ever louder in the New World. The occupation of the Iberian peninsula by Napoleon's troops in 1807–8 necessitated the transfer of the Portuguese court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro while the forced abdications of the Bourbon kings at Bayonne triggered a crisis of sovereignty that finally unravelled the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy.⁶ In the subsequent decades, the tail end of Europe's formal dominion over Latin America, reciprocal influences abounded.

The 1820s as a Decade of Reconfiguration and Recalibration

The silence of historians on the decade of the 1820s is significant. The neglect of the continuities of this decade, particularly the latter half of it, has given unjustified support to a range of theories about European, Latin American and global historical changes during the nineteenth century. It has been assumed too readily, for example, that the Age of Revolutions entailed the abrupt cessation of links between Europe and the Americas, triggering divergent historical evolution. Undeniably, the bonds that had fastened each to the other did slacken. During the Axial Age, as Europe extended its formal dominion over great swathes of Asia and Africa, Latin America largely escaped unscathed.⁷ Recolonization by Europe was rarely seriously contemplated. To be sure, there was a great deal of bluster, such as when Spain's foreign minister told the British ambassador that Ferdinand VII would 'never cease to employ the force of arms against his rebellious subjects'.⁸ Formal sovereignty was threatened from time to time in the nineteenth century, including France's belligerent bullying of Haiti to pay an indemnity (1825), Spain's invasion of Mexico (1829), the frequent Franco-British bombardments of Buenos Aires, and Spain's gunboat diplomacy in Chile and Peru (early 1860s). Nevertheless, except for the French-backed installation of Maximilian on the throne of Mexico (1864–67) and Spain's reincorporation of Santo Domingo (1865), these efforts were rarely sustained and even less often successful. Latin American states had much more to fear from the United States, which seized Florida (1819), annexed Texas (1845), and stripped Mexico of more than half of

its claimed national territory (1848), not to mention its relentless filibustering in the Caribbean and Central America throughout the nineteenth century.⁹

The absence of formal dominion notwithstanding, the extent of the rupture ushered in by independence and the end of mutual influence between the Old World and the New, after 1820, has been exaggerated with distorting effect. The end of the Iberian empires shifted the terms of the relations between Europe and Latin America, but it did not attenuate them. Connections continued, though they often were reconfigured. Contemporaries were aware that links would persist despite the shifting of the geopolitical plates. In his widely-read tract 'Rid Yourselves of Ultramarina', Jeremy Bentham predicted that ties of language, culture and kinship would ensure commercial contacts and political involvement after empire's demise in Ibero-America.¹⁰ Bentham vastly underestimated the situation: colonial-era laws and institutions paradoxically remained in effect well after independence throughout the Americas as nascent states grappled with how they should be replaced.¹¹ New polities found it nearly impossible to abrogate unfavourable trade treaties signed by pre-independence governments, often under duress, whose long-term effects on economic development were routinely and widely lamented. Furthermore, European colonialism persisted in small yet strategically crucial fragments of Latin America. Spain retained Cuba and Puerto Rico while France, Britain, and the Netherlands clung to sugar-producing islands in the Caribbean and territorial footholds on the northern coast of South America. The 1820s, in fact, were the 'golden age' of sugar production in the French West Indies as French imports from the colonies and the number of ships involved in the colonial trade doubled between 1816 and 1829.¹² The British presence was also strengthened in these years: Britain went on to increase its presence in the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands in 1833, and also expanded the frontiers of its colony in Guiana in the 1840s.¹³

Europeans in the Midst of Change in Latin America

In justifying Britain's recognition of Latin American independence, through treaties of amity and friendship signed in 1825, Foreign Secretary George Canning boasted that he had struck a blow for liberty against the arch-monarchical Congress System. He claimed to have brought 'the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old'.¹⁴ This was much more of a boast than a blow. The hot air of the British House of Commons had generally dissipated into the Atlantic winds by the time it reached Latin America. Rather than diplomatic bluster, it was home-grown declarations of sovereignty that presaged the formation of new polities. Independence was achieved through the efforts of Latin Americans, and the contribution of European politicians, like Canning, was peripheral at best. However, of course, these processes involved Latin American reaction to European events, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion and occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807–8.¹⁵ Furthermore, the very achievement of independence was aided and abetted by non-state European actors, as recent research

into the activities of itinerant foreign revolutionaries, adventurers, spies, freebooters, and merchants in Spanish America has revealed.¹⁶ The new Latin American polities, nominally sovereign, found themselves linked to Europe by foreigners in their midsts. In some cases, it was Spaniards or Portuguese who remained after empire's end, whose presence was sometimes found to be undesirable and triggered, respectively, anti-Spanish and Lusophobic riots.¹⁷ In other cases, such as in Buenos Aires, British merchant communities burgeoned as trade restrictions fell, whereas in Brazil the government encouraged the emigration of German farmers and Irish mercenaries.¹⁸

Europe's presence also was felt in more coercive ways, many of which have been traditionally lumped together as components of 'informal empire'.¹⁹ Loans taken from European financiers, generally but not exclusively through the City of London, enabled Latin American states to remain afloat when they were too weak to impose direct taxes.²⁰ Many of these loans were in default by the late 1820s and, where they were not, the perils of unsustainable debt-funded state-building were obvious. By 1830, for example, Brazil had borrowed four times its annual revenue.²¹ As the heirs as well as the antagonists of colonial regimes, Latin American nations retained old connections to the world markets, exporting commodities and precious metals while often deepening their dependence on African slave labour. Reliance on slave labour brought these nascent polities into open conflict with a British state purportedly committed to the abolition of such 'odious commerce' and prepared to send its frigates to patrol South American waters.²² By the mid-1830s, British exports of cottons to Latin America had reached an annual value of around £3,206,000, a figure which had serious effects on local manufacturers across the continent, and one of the first signs that Spain and Portugal's former colonies might be entering Britain's 'informal empire'.²³ The inconclusive nature of inter-state warfare sometimes precipitated European mediation, including British intervention in the war between the United Provinces of Argentina and Brazil which resulted in the creation of the independent buffer-state of Uruguay in 1828.²⁴

Intellectual Ties across the Atlantic

In addition to commerce, finance and immigration, ideas also linked Europe and Latin America in the 1820s. The composition of constitutions for the new Latin American states often involved the accommodation of European political thought to American soil.²⁵ The political thought of the French Restoration, with its attempt to steer a middle, moderate course between republicanism and absolute monarchy, exerted a major influence, particularly in Brazil where Benjamin Constant's notion of *pouvoir neutre* was enshrined in the 1824 constitution as the *poder moderador* and where François Guizot's *juste milieu* would animate the *Regresso* movement of the mid-1830s.²⁶ British ideas, too, proved influential, whether one looks to Rivadavia's efforts to implement Benthamite ideas or to

Bolívar's enchantment with the British political system.²⁷ But perhaps the greatest influence, paradoxically, remained the Spanish constitution of 1812. Though Spanish American liberals had clashed with their Peninsular counterparts at Cádiz, the 1812 constitution remained widely influential after independence. While breaking from their Spanish forerunner in the establishment of a strong executive, rejection of unicameralism, and modification of a broad franchise, the following Latin American constitutions bore unmistakable traces of the Cádiz model: Argentina (1826), Chile (1828), Peru (1828), New Granada (1830, 1832), Uruguay (1830) and Venezuela (1830).²⁸ Furthermore, in the political turmoil following independence, eighteenth-century 'enlightened reform', often combined with a Bonapartism derived from the French-Revolutionary inheritance, retained its attractiveness.²⁹

It was not only the example of Europe, as conveyed through books, pamphlets and newspapers, from which ideas were drawn. Direct relationships also played a key role. The networks, ideas and values of foreigners in Latin America after 1820 have not been studied in much depth, though some historians are now beginning to view these individuals as mediators between cultures. Cultural interaction and exchange was fostered by the presence of European scientists and artists, whether freelance or state-sponsored, in the early years following independence.³⁰ Furthermore, the entire concept of what it meant to be 'foreign' in societies of extreme demographic diversity was interrogated by Latin American elites who often privileged pragmatic motives over identity politics when determining who could, or could not, become a member of their new nations.³¹ The distinction between a European and, say, a 'Colombian' or a 'Chilean' was surprisingly fluid throughout the 1820s.

Thinking about Influence the Other Way Round

The connections and exchanges summarized above may make it seem as though influence between Latin America and Europe was unidirectional, that political and cultural influence followed the trade winds that had swept Columbus to the Americas three centuries earlier. But this was far from the case in the 1820s. Political and cultural transfer transformed both sides of the Atlantic.³² Latin American affairs reverberated powerfully in the Old World after formal dominion ended. The first and most obvious impact was the national introspection it provoked in the former metropolises of Spain and Portugal, even if the economic impact proved less severe than feared by contemporaries and previously supposed by latter-day historians.³³ Iberian elites were forced to grapple with shrunken revenues and diminished international stature. For Spain, it entailed rethinking the remnants of its empire – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines – a process that proceeded fitfully, as evidenced by Ferdinand VII's refusal to countenance recognition of most of the ex-colonies up until his death in 1833.³⁴ In Portugal, debates raged concerning Portugal's economic (and political) viability without colonies and the

feasibility of establishing the plantation agriculture system lost in Brazil in Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé.³⁵

Yet the impact went beyond the trauma triggered by colonial dismemberment. The independence of Latin America was a powerful inspiration for what historian Maurizio Isabella has christened the 'Liberal International' of the post-Napoleonic period.³⁶ As exiles from the failed revolutions of 1820–23 in Portugal, Naples, Piedmont and Spain plotted their next steps, they were keenly aware, in Portuguese poet and politician Almeida Garrett's phrase, that they had received the 'example and impulse of liberty from America'.³⁷ For the Italian exiles, the establishment of republics in the New World was the indispensable precondition for the creation of a global federal order.³⁸ Nor were these beleaguered revolutionaries and exiles alone. Latin American independence coincided with the rise of European romanticism, with its repudiation of established systems, enchantment with liberty and individuality against tyranny and constraint, and cult of adventure.³⁹ Like the contemporary Greek struggle for independence, the Romantics saw in Latin America the antithesis of the spiritual corruption, venality and decadence of Europe.⁴⁰ But if Spanish America was often a beacon or inspiration, its example could also be construed as an albatross: the public dispute between Constant and the Abbé de Pradt, an acolyte of Napoleon who became an influential commentator on Latin American affairs, concerning Bolívar's authoritarian drift is emblematic of how closely the European public followed Latin American political and economic developments. Interest was not always abstract. Besides the material interests of European lenders, bondholders and merchants, Latin American affairs intersected with the aims of European powers.⁴¹ Here the abolition of the slave trade, and Brazilian and Hispano-Cuban resistance to it, loomed large. Though in smaller numbers than at the close of the nineteenth century, Europeans flocked to the New World, sometimes with mixed results, and their misadventures and broken dreams filled newspaper columns and catalysed armchair fantasies of exotic lands.⁴²

The essays offered in this special issue highlight the persistence of mutual influence and connections between Europe and Latin America after independence. They focus almost exclusively on the relations between Latin America and the ex-metropolises of Spain and Portugal. They are largely confined to intellectual and political connections, though a full account would address economic and cultural links that survived, and even expanded, after the dissolution of the Iberian empires.⁴³ We start from the premise that transnational history, when confined to a single continent, cannot adequately account for the global dimension of intellectual development and political change. Historians are growing accustomed to locating the 'imperial' or 'extra-European' aspects of European political thought and to the tensions between the expansion of liberalism in Europe and the creation of regimes of 'exception' in the colonies.⁴⁴ Yet the essays in this special issue reveal that intellectual influence often operated outside of the framework of empire and that it strayed beyond the confines of national as well as continental boundaries. The project of which this special issue forms a part seeks to unbound imperial

histories from their national moorings, and in so doing, deepen our understanding of how modern Latin America coalesced after independence, and of how these Latin American processes left marks on modern Europe's development.

Acknowledgements

We record our gratitude to the following institutions for their material support of this project: Trinity College, University of Cambridge; the Bristol Institute for Research in the Humanities and the Arts; the Royal Historical Society; the Cambridge Centre for History and Economics; and the Cambridge Centre for Latin American Studies. We also thank Rebecca Earle, Brian Hamnett and Francis King for their comments on draft versions of this Introduction.

Notes

1. Eliga Gould, 'Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 112, no. 3 (2007), 764–86.
2. Most recently, see John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven and London 2006); Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford 2009); and Bernard Bailyn, ed., *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500–1830* (Cambridge, MA 2009).
3. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds, *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760–1840* (Basingstoke 2010).
4. For a general view of these connections, see the essays contained in Matthew Brown and Gabriel Paquette, eds, *Connections after Colonialism: The Reconfiguration of Relations between Europe and Latin America in the 1820s* (Tuscaloosa, AL forthcoming).
5. J.R. McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620–1914* (Cambridge 2010), 247.
6. Above all, see Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford 2006).
7. For an overview, see C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1789–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford 2004).
8. Quoted in Michael Costeloe, *Response the Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810–1840* (Cambridge 1986), 97.
9. For an overview, see George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford 2008).
10. Jonathan Harris, 'An English Utilitarian looks at Spanish-American Independence: Jeremy Bentham's *Rid Yourselves of Ultramarina*', *The Americas*, Vol. 53 (1996), 217–233.
11. See, e.g., José Carlos Chiaramonte, 'The "Ancient Constitution" after Independence (1808–52)', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, no. 3 (2010), 455–72.
12. Lawrence C. Jennings, *French Anti-slavery: The Movement for the Abolition of Slavery in France 1802–48* (Cambridge 2000), 26.
13. Rory Miller, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London 1993), 49.
14. George Canning, 'Address on the King's Message Respecting Portugal', 12 December 1826, cited in Leslie Bethell, *George Canning and the Emancipation of Latin America* (London 1970), 17; while perhaps of limited influence for events in Latin America,

Canning's actions proved decisive in the European diplomatic theatre, where they served to dampen French ambitions to convert their power in Spain as a foothold for intervention in its rebellious colonies. See Howard Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance and the New World* (London 1966).

15. Most recently, see Manuel Lucena Giraldo, *Naciones de rebeldes: Las revoluciones de independencia latinoamericanas* (Madrid 2010); for an analysis of the impact of European events on Spanish American independence, see Gabriel Paquette, 'The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy', *Historical Journal*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2009), 175–212; the older historiography, which draws extensively on diplomatic sources, remains extremely useful and relevant, see, e.g., William Spence Robertson, *France and Latin American Independence* (Baltimore 1939); and William Kaufmann, *British Policy and the Independence of Latin America 1804–1828* (New Haven 1951).
16. Rafe Blaufarb, 'The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 112, no. 3 (2007), 742–763; Matthew Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simón Bolívar, Foreign Mercenaries, and the Birth of New Nations* (Liverpool 2006).
17. Jordana Dym, 'Citizens of which Republic? Foreigners and the Construction of National Citizenship in Central America, 1823–1845', *The Americas*, Vol. 64, no. 4 (2008), 477–510; Harold Sims, *The Expulsion of Mexico's Spaniards, 1821–1836* (Pittsburgh 1990); and Jeffrey Mosher, *Political Struggle, Ideology and State-building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817–1850* (Lincoln, NE and London 2008), Chapter 7 'Political Parties, Popular Mobilization and the Portuguese'.
18. David Rock, 'Liberal Revolution Deferred: Rivadavia and the British', in Brown and Paquette, eds, op. cit.; George P. Browne, 'Government Immigration Policy in Imperial Brazil, 1822–70', PhD Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1972, 77–88 passim.
19. Matthew Brown, ed., *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford 2008).
20. Carlos Marichal, *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America, from Independence to the Great Depression* (Princeton, NJ 1989); Frank Griffith Dawson, *The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and the 1822–25 Loan Bubble* (New Haven and London 1990).
21. Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, PA 2002), 134.
22. Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–69* (Cambridge 1970); and David Murray, *Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain, and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade* (Cambridge 1980).
23. Miller, op. cit., 73.
24. Peter Winn, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century', *Past & Present*, Vol. 73, no. 1 (1976), 100–26.
25. The literature on European political influence on independence dates back to the early 1940s, where Arthur Whitaker's pioneering book created a paradigm that imagined European ideas being implanted in Latin America, whose nuances were often lost by the many scholars who followed in its wake. See Whitaker, ed., *Latin America and the Enlightenment* (Ithaca, NY 1942).

26. On Constant's influence, see Gabriel Paquette's essay in this special issue, [444–71]; on Guizot's influence in Brazil, see Jeffrey Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871* (Stanford 2006).
27. Klaus Gallo, *The Struggle for an Enlightened Republic: Buenos Aires and Rivadavia* (London 2006); Karen Racine, 'Simón Bolívar, Englishman: Elite Responsibility and Social Reform in Spanish American Independence', in Lester Langley and David Bushnell, eds., *Simón Bolívar: Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator* (Boulder 2007), 55–72; and Karen Racine, "'This England and This Now": British Cultural and Intellectual Influence in the Spanish American Independence Era', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, no. 3 (2010), 423–54.
28. Frank Safford, 'Politics, Ideology, and Society', in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Spanish America after Independence, c.1820–70* (Cambridge 1987), 62–3.
29. Anthony McFarlane, 'Identity, Enlightenment and Political Dissent in Late Colonial Spanish America', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series, Vol. 8 (1998), 334.
30. Lilia Moritz Schwartz, 'Sobres Modelos, Ajustes e Traduções: O Sol do Brasil e os Trópicos Díficeis nas Telas de Artistas da "Colônia Lebreton"', *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, Vol. 168 (2007), 187–222; Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London 1992), 172–200.
31. Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies*, 162–8; for the earlier period, Tamar Herzog, *Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven 2003).
32. Eugenia Roldán Vera and Marcelo Carruso, eds, *Imported Modernity in Post-Colonial State Formation: The Appropriation of Political, Educational, and Cultural Models in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Berlin 2007).
33. Enrique Lopis Agelán and José Antonio Sebastián Amarilla, 'Impulso Económico e Inestabilidad: España, 1808–1850', in Llopis and Carlos Marichal, eds, *Latinoamérica e España, 1800–1850. Un Crecimiento Económico Nada Excepcional* (Madrid 2009), 161–210.
34. Josep M. Fradera, *Colonias para después de un Imperio* (Barcelona 2005); and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Anti-Slavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–74* (Pittsburgh 1999).
35. In English, see Valentim Alexandre, 'The Portuguese Empire, 1825–90: Ideology and Economics', in Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, ed., *From Slave Trade to Empire: Europe and the Colonisation of Black Africa, 1780s–1880s* (London and New York 2004); and Gabriel Paquette, 'After Brazil: Portuguese Debates on Empire, c. 1820–50', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2010), online only.
36. Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford 2009).
37. Almeida Garrett, 'Da Europa e da América e de sua mutual influência na causa da Civilização e da liberdade', in Garrett, *Obras Completas; Obra Política (1824–27)* (Lisbon 1991), 85.
38. Isabella, op. cit., 106.
39. Maurice Bowra, *The Romantic Imagination* (Oxford 1988), 149–51; Harold Bloom, *The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic Poetry* (Ithaca, NY 1971).
40. Most recently, Rebecca Cole Heinowitz, *Spanish America and British Romanticism, 1777–1826: Rewriting Conquest* (Edinburgh 2010).

41. For example the essays in Brown, ed., *Informal Empire*, op. cit.
42. Kevin Foster, *Lost Worlds: Latin America and the Imagining of Empire* (London 2009).
43. For a first attempt, see the essays contained in Brown and Paquette, eds, op. cit.
44. Among others, see Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ 2005); and Josep M. Fradera, 'Reading Imperial Transitions: Spanish Contraction, British Expansion, and American Irruption', in Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, eds, *Colonial Crucible: Empire and the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, WI and London 2009), 34–62.

Matthew Brown is a Reader in Latin American Studies and Director of the Centre for the Study of Colonial and Postcolonial Societies at the University of Bristol. He is the author of *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simón Bolívar, Foreign Mercenaries and the Birth of New Nations* (Liverpool University Press 2006), the editor of *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Blackwell 2008) and the translator and editor of *Simón Bolívar: The Bolivarian Revolution, introduced by Hugo Chávez* (Verso 2009).

Gabriel Paquette is an Assistant Professor of History at The Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD, USA). He was previously a Junior Research Fellow at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, and a Lecturer at Harvard University. Paquette is the author of *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808* (Palgrave Macmillan 2008), and the editor of *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830* (Ashgate 2009).